AWE admits failings over fire
Internal report shows that the cause was likely to have been an electric discharge
A REPORT into a fire at the nuclear bomb factory in Aldermaston last August has concluded that the cause was likely to have been an electric discharge which set a highly flammable lacquer ablaze.
The hazard had previously been acknowledged by the Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE), but the complex nature of the specific substance had not been taken into account, the report stated.
Meanwhile, following its internal investigation, which was commissioned by AWE to determine the circumstances which led to the fire and to make recommendations for improvement, the establishment admitted it fell short of the highest standards and has halted all lacquer production at the site.
The fire at Aldermaston started just after 9pm on August 3, 2010, when the lacquer used for making explosives burst into flames in a building within the facility.
Sixteen fire engines and 68 firefighters attended the incident and battled the blaze for five hours, evacuating residents living in 14 neighbouring houses and throwing a 600m safety cordon around the site's perimeter.
One member of AWE staff was injured and treated for burns by first aiders on the site.
The report into AWE's internal investigation of the incident, released yesterday (Wednesday), highlighted several procedural shortcomings that could have prevented the fire, such as:
- the lacquer production, which caused the fire, was not carried out in accordance with instructions and the production had taken place a day earlier than authorised
- staff taking part in the production were found to have felt under pressure and some were intending to work a 16-hour shift
- AWE's safety management system was found to be complex and, in certain areas, difficult to use
- the work area contained explosives that were not needed for the operation being conducted. These were not involved in the fire, but the investigators said that they should not have been in the building.
Investigators added that the emergency services response was incorrect, stating: "While the emergency response to the incident on the night was prompt, AWE's fire and rescue services went directly to the scene of the fire. This was due to their initial concern to ensure the safety of any casualties. They should have gone first to the work control centre where they would have received briefing on the casualty and explosives situation."
The investigators made eleven recommendations for improvement at AWE, saying that the company should: better mangage, store and minimise risks with hazardous materials; avoid significantly extended working hours; ensure a suitable training and competency system was in place, and ensure audit and inspection programmes for safety are adequate.
It also recommended that AWE should conduct a joint review with the local authority to identify necessary changes to plans for responding off site during non-radiological events, stating: "This should include communications in general in a non-nuclear incident."
AWE's managing director, Dr Andrew Jupp, accepted all of the recommendations and said: “We are sorry that this incident occurred and have already taken decisive action to ensure that it doesn't happen again. We know that AWE has to maintain the highest safety standards. On this occasion we fell short of this.
"The particular operation taking place at the time of the incident will not restart until we, and the Health & Safety Executive, are satisfied that a safe alternative process has been developed.
"The reviews we have already carried out give us confidence that this was an isolated event. We know there is no room for complacency."
